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IV

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
James Wenke appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction. For his alleged
possession of approximately six and one-half ounces of marijuana, Mr. Wenke was sentenced to
40 years, with 20 years fixed, after he was found guilty of one count of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver and being a persistent violator.
In the appellant's brief, Mr. Wenke argued that the district court abused its discretion
when it allowed the State to play a video of Mr. Wenke in a jail cell. He also argued the district
court abused its discretion when it allowed an accomplice to testify regarding prior bad act
evidence. He also asserted that the prosecutor committed several instances of misconduct, which
amounted to fundamental error. Finally, he asserted that, even if the errors might be viewed as
harmless individually, the cumulative error doctrine applied.
This reply brief is necessary to respond to address the State's claims on the first, second,
and third issues. The State's argument regarding cumulative error is unremarkable and does not
warrant additional briefing.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated m
Mr. Wenke's Appellant's Brie£ 1

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference.

1

In its "Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings," the State portrays an
accomplice witness's testimony as fact. (Resp. Br., pp.1-3; Tr., p.445, Ls.18-19.) Rather than
prefacing its "facts" with statements such as "Ms. Hickman testified," the State repeats her
testimony and thus implies those statements were established facts. However, Ms. Hickman's
credibility was a significant issue at trial. In fact, the district court found that she was not
credible to testify on certain issues because her testimony at the preliminary hearing was
completely different, and it was contradictory to the other accomplice witness's testimony.
(Tr., p.312, L.8 - p.313, L.20.)
2

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted State's Exhibit 8, the bodycam
video from Officer Mattson, without redaction, because the district court did not conduct
the proper balancing test, the video was misleading and irrelevant, and the video's limited
probative value was substantially outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial effect?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed Ms. Hickman to testify that she
had previously seen Mr. Wenke divide up and weigh marijuana because the district
court's finding that there was sufficient evidence to establish that alleged prior act as fact
was clearly erroneous?

III.

Did the State violate Mr. Wenke's right to a fair trial by committing prosecutorial
misconduct amounting to fundamental error?

IV.

Even if the above errors are individually harmless, was Mr. Wenke's Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process of law violated because the accumulation of errors
deprived him of his right to a fair trial?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Admitted State's Exhibit 8, The Bodycam
Video From Officer Mattson, Without Redaction, Because The District Court Did Not Conduct
The Proper Balancing Test, The Video Was Misleading And Irrelevant, And The Video's
Limited Probative Value Was Substantially Outweighed By Its Unfairly Prejudicial Effect

A.

The State Has Failed To Show The District Court Conducted A Proper Balancing Test
Under I.R.E. 403 Before Admitting Officer Mattson's Bodycam Video
In his appellant's brief, Mr. Wenke argued that the district court abused its discretion

when it admitted the video without redaction because it failed to conduct a proper balancing test
under I.R.E. 403. (App. Br., pp.10-13.) In response, the State claims that the district court did
not abuse its discretion because the "district court made clear, albeit in the context of a different
piece of evidence, that it correctly understood how I.R.E. 403 works."

(Resp. Br., p.11

(emphasis added).) It argues that because the district court had previously "correctly articulated"
how to conduct the Rule 403 balancing test, its statement regarding the video-"! find that it's
relevant.

And I don't find that it's overly prejudicial"-showed it conducted the proper

balancing test. (Resp. Br., pp.11-12.) The State claims, "Idaho's appellate courts have never
required anything more." (Resp. Br., p.12.) This is wrong. District courts are "required to
address 'whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by any one of the
considerations listed' in Rule 403." State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 139 (2014) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted). And the Court of Appeals has recognized that the two applicable rules
of evidence require two separate analyses:

"First, the trial court must determine that the

evidence is relevant under I.R.E. 401; and, second, the court must determine that the probative
value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." State v.
Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818, 822 (Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added).

4

The district court conducted no such analysis here. As such, the State argues that this
Court can "infer from the record" that the district court conducted a proper Rule 403 balancing
test. (Resp. Br., p.12.) Relying in part on an unpublished decision, the State asserts "the record
here dispositively demonstrates that the district court conducted a proper Rule 403 analysis .... "
(Resp. Br., p.12.) Thus, the State suggests that district courts can conduct improper balancing
tests in which they commingle what is clearly a two-step process as long as they recite the
correct standard at some other point in the proceedings. However, simply because the district
court reads the rule from a prior case 2 when commenting on an I.RE. 404(b) issue does not
prove it applies the test correctly when analyzing another piece of evidence. Indeed, when it
analyzed the video, there is no indication the court measured the probative worth of the video by
focusing "upon the degree of relevance and materiality of the evidence and the need for it on the
issue on which it is to be introduced." Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107, 110 (1987)
(citation omitted).
Davidson makes it clear that consideration of an exhibit's probative value is different
from both an initial finding that the exhibit is relevant and a finding as to whether the evidence is
unfairly prejudicial: "At the other end of the equation, the trial judge must consider whether the
evidence amounts to unfair prejudice." Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, the State's argument
that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to conduct a proper balancing test
is meritless.

2

The district court noted that its recitation of the rule came from State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52
(2009). (Tr., p.8, Ls.14-19.)
5

B.

His Objection To The Video, And His Arguments On Appeal With Respect To The
Video Were Preserved By His Initial Objection
The State asserts that Mr. Wenke' s arguments as to the video are "not properly before

this Court on appeal." (Resp. Br., pp.13-15.) In the district court, counsel objected to the
admission of "every other part of the video" other than Mr. Wenke's statement at the end of the
video regarding the black bag. (1/22/18 Tr., p.36, L.21 - p.37, L.3.) He argued, "[P]art of the
video is Mr. Wenke getting upset with Mattson regarding him being arrested and goes off
essentially swearing at him. I think if that's introduced, that's doing nothing but essentially
showing that Mr. Wenke is a bad guy, convict him. So I would ask them to further redact that
video."

(1/22/18 Tr., p.37, Ls.4-12.) The State argues that Mr. Wenke has abandoned his

argument as to the swearing. (Resp. Br., p.14.) This is not true. The State's quote from the
appellant's brief omits a specific reference to the swearing having contributed to the prejudicial
nature of the video; the State writes, "Wenke argues ... that 'the video was unfairly prejudicial
because it showed [him] behind bars." (Resp. Br., p.18 (quoting App. Br, p.13.).) The State
neglects to use ellipses at the end of this quote and also neglects to mention that the end of the
quote reads, "swearing at Officer Mattson." (App. Br., p.13.) Mr. Wenke made the same point
earlier in his appellant's brief (App. Br, p.9.) Therefore, he did not abandon the argument on
appeal. He did, however, refine the argument regarding unfair prejudice and point out that the
jury not only saw Mr. Wenke swearing at an officer, it saw him doing so when he was behind
bars. (App. Br., p.13.)
The State cites to State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 439 P.3d 1267 (2019) for the
proposition that in order for issues to be preserved on appeal, the issue and the party's position
on the issue have to be raised before the trial court. (Resp. Br., p.13.) It then argues that none of
Mr. Wenke's arguments regarding the video were preserved.
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(Resp. Br., pp.15-18.)

In

Gonzalez, the Court discussed the distinction between its holdings regarding preservation in Ada
Cnty. Highway Dist. v. Brooke View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138 (2017), and State v. Garcia-Rodriguez,
162 Idaho 271 (2017).

With respect to Brooke View, it stated that an issue was properly

preserved below because "only specific arguments had changed, not ACHD's issue or position
on the issue." Gonzalez, 439 P.3d at 1270. It also noted that "ACHD did not change its legal
position toward that distinct issue ... even though the specific legal arguments it used to support
its position had evolved." Id. By contrast, it pointed out that the State, in Garcia-Rodriguez,
"took up a wholly new" argument on appeal. Id. In summary, it wrote that "both the issue and
the party's position on the issue must be raised before the trial court for it to be properly
preserved for appeal." Id. at 1271. It analogized that "Brooke View portrays a party riding on a
horse that has been groomed and reshod for the appellate process, whereas Garcia-Rodriguez
exemplifies a party entering the appellate process on an entirely new horse." Id.
In this case, trial counsel objected to the State playing the majority of the video because it
was unfairly prejudicial and, except for the last portion of the video in which Mr. Wenke
mentioned the black bag, it was not relevant. (1/22/18 Tr., p.36, L.21 - p.37, L.12.) He said, I
think if that's introduced, that's doing nothing but essentially showing that Mr. Wenke is a bad
guy, convict him." (1/22/18 Tr., p.37, Ls.8-10.) By saying the rest of the video was "doing
nothing," counsel was arguing, at least implicitly, that the other parts of the video were not
relevant or probative. As such, when the district court ruled on counsel's objection to the video,
it said, "Mr. Schiller, I know your position. And I find that it's relevant, and I don't find that it's
overly prejudicial, so I will allow the State to use that CD." (Tr., p.148, L.24 - p.149, L.4.)
Thus, his argument on appeal that "the portion of the video in which Officer Mattson says he
found over a pound of marijuana and therefore Mr. Wenke would be charged with trafficking

7

[was] not relevant because less than half a pound was discovered, and Mr. Wenke was never
charged with trafficking" (App. Br., p.12), is preserved because it is not a new argument.
Similarly, his arguments on appeal regarding the prejudicial nature of the video are
preserved. Those did not concern a new issue or a different argument but were tied to counsel's
original position that the other parts of the video were unfairly prejudicial.

Therefore, his

argument on appeal that the video was also unfairly prejudicial because Officer Mattson said he
found over a pound of marijuana and thus Mr. Wenke would be charged with trafficking, as well
as his argument that the video was unfairly prejudicial because it showed Mr. Wenke behind bars
swearing at Officer Mattson are preserved. (App. Br., pp.12-13.) While his specific arguments
about why the video was prejudicial have evolved, he has not changed his position on the issue
of whether playing the unredacted video was unfairly prejudicial.

C.

The State Has Failed To Assert Or Demonstrate That The Error In Admitting The Video
Without Redaction Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
The State claims, "The improper admission of evidence is harmless where the improperly

admitted evidence is cumulative of evidence admitted without an objection." (Resp. Br., p.20
(citing Pacheco v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 116 Idaho 794, 798 (1989); State v. Woodbury, 127
Idaho 757, 761 (Ct. App. 1995).) This is the wrong standard ofreview.
It is well established that, "[t]o establish harmless error, the State must prove 'beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."' State v.

Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 911 (2015) (citing State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2010) (in tum
quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Thus, it is not enough for the State to
assert the jury would have convicted Mr. Wenke if the district court did not allow the State to play
the entire unredacted video because the video was cumulative of other evidence. The State must
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first assert, and then prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that allowing the State to play the video
did not contribute to the guilty verdict.
It appears the State has limited its harmless error argument to responding to Mr. Wenk.e's
argument about the prejudicial impact of the jury seeing Mr. Wenke behind bars; it argues that
"the visual of Wenke in the jail did not convey anything to the jury that it did not already know
and thus could not have contributed to the verdict."

(Resp. Br., p.20.)

While the State's

argument indicates it is attempting to argue under the proper standard, it fails to cite that standard
or show that the admission of the unredacted video was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Further, it does not argue that any of the irrelevant or prejudicial aspects of the video were
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As such, it has waived the issue.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed Ms. Hickman To Testify That She
Had Previously Seen Mr. Wenke Divide Up And Weigh Marijuana Because The District Court's
Finding That There Was Sufficient Evidence To Establish That Alleged Prior Act As Fact Was
Clearly Erroneous

A.

The State Has Failed To Show That The District Court Properly Found There Was
Sufficient Evidence To Establish Mr. Wenk.e's Alleged Prior Bad Acts As Fact
At trial, the district court allowed Ms. Hickman to testify she had in the past seen

Mr. Wenke divide and weigh marijuana. In his appellant's brief, Mr. Wenke argued that the
district court's implicit finding that there was sufficient evidence to establish Ms. Hickman had
previously seen him divide and weigh marijuana was clearly erroneous because it was not
supported by substantial and competent evidence. (App. Br., pp.13-18.)
In response, the State argues the district court only found Ms. Hickman not credible to
testify as to prior incidents of distribution, but not as to incidents of dividing and weighing.
(Resp. Br., p.25.) But the fact remains there was no substantial and competent evidence on
9

which the district court could have relied to establish the alleged prior bad acts as fact. To admit
evidence under I.R.E. 404(b), the trial court must first "determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as fact." State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009).
Appellate courts will treat a "trial court's factual determination that a prior bad act has been
established by sufficient evidence" as any other factual finding; it will "defer to a trial court's
factual fmdings if supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record." State v.
Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 214 (Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted).

Substantial and competent

evidence is "'relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."' Estate ofAikele v. City ofBlaclifoot, 160 Idaho 903, 911 (2016) (citation omitted).
Here, the single piece of evidence to establish the prior acts was Ms. Hickman's
testimony prior to the start of the second day of trial, which the district court found conflicted
with her testimony at the preliminary hearing and with the other accomplice's testimony. (See
Tr., p.312, L.12-p.313, L.20.) While Ms. Hickman was not asked specifically whether she had
seen Mr. Wenke divide and weigh marijuana at that preliminary hearing, she did testify about the
presence of scales as follows:
Q:

Ms. Hickman, are you aware that there were scales found in your home?

A:

Yes, I was asked about them; yes.

Q:

Okay. And those scales were in your home prior to Mr. Wenke coming into your
home; is that correct?

A:

They could have been.

Q:

They could have been?

A:

Yeah.

Q:

So you didn't know whether or not the scales were in your home?
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A:

I didn’t even know they were there until the officer came that night and asked
about them.

Q:

Okay. Did you know about a zippered pouch found in your laundry room with
baggies in it?

A:

Yeah. I did know about those.

Q:

Okay. And those were there before Mr. Wenke came to your residence; correct?

A:

Yeah. Yeah.

Q:

Are you aware of anyone in your home distributing drugs out of your home?

A:

No.

Q:

Okay. But you are aware of the scales and the baggies that were in your home?

A:

I wasn’t aware of the scale.

(R., p.72 – Prelim Tr., p.86, L.6 – p.87, L.7.)
Later, at the hearing held outside the presence of the jury prior to the second day of the
trial, Ms. Hickman testified as follows:
Q:

Now, these two occasions, you said you’d see him both put it, divide it up, and
then put it in baggies?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Did he also weigh this marijuana?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Did he use — so far as you’re aware, are you aware of the scales that were found?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Did he use either of those scales to weigh this marijuana?

A:

I don’t believe so. I believe he had his own.

Q:

His own? All right. Were either of the scales found in your home his scales?

A:

I don’t believe so.

11

(Tr., p.302, Ls.6-20.)
This testimony makes it clear that Ms. Hickman did know there was at least one scale in
her home at some point. Therefore, this testimony also conflicts with her testimony at the
preliminary hearing. This goes directly to her testimony regarding having seen Mr. Wenke
weighing marijuana. It shows that, like her other proposed testimony, it was not supported by
substantial and competent evidence because, in light of the contradiction, it was not evidence that
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Therefore, there was not
sufficient evidence to establish Mr. Wenke’s prior acts as fact.
Moreover, Ms. Hickman’s testimony regarding dividing and weighing marijuana was
directly connected with her testimony about having seen Mr. Wenke distribute drugs, which the
district court did not allow. Indeed, the prosecutor’s questions about dividing and weighing
marijuana were in regard to the same marijuana she said she had supposedly seen Mr. Wenke
distribute. (Tr., p.301, L.15 – p.302, L.10.) Further, as argued in the appellant’s brief, there is
no reason to divide and weigh marijuana unless one intends to distribute it—the acts are
inextricably intertwined. (App. Br., p.17.) And, at the preliminary hearing, Ms. Hickman
testified that she was not aware of anyone distributing drugs out of her home. (R., p.72 – Prelim
Tr., p.81, Ls.1-3.) However, at the hearing out of the presence of the jury prior to the second day
of trial, she said the exact opposite. (Tr., p.300, Ls.3-15.)
Additionally, the district court’s finding that she was not credible to testify as to any prior
incidents of distribution was supported by more than simply its findings that she testified
differently at the preliminary hearing, and her testimony was completely different than the other
accomplice, Ms. Witte.

(Tr., p.312, L.12 – p.313, L.20; p.445, Ls.18-19.)

Ms. Hickman

admitted she was under the influence of methamphetamine on the day she allegedly picked up
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Mr. Wenke in Oregon. (Tr., p.341, Ls.8-14.) She admitted she lied at the preliminary hearing;
she admitted she could not remember that she testified to picking Mr. Wenke up at his home at
the preliminary hearing; and she was clearly still confused as to the course of events on the day
in question on the second day oftrial. 3 (Tr., p.305, L.12 - p.306, L.25.) Therefore, none of her
testimony regarding alleged prior bad acts should have been considered credible.
As such, the district court erred when it implicitly found there was sufficient evidence to
establish as fact that she had previously seen Mr. Wenke divide and weigh marijuana. Thus, it
abused its discretion when it allowed Ms. Hickman to testify as to any alleged prior bad acts.

B.

The State Has Failed To Assert Or Demonstrate That The Error In Allowing
Ms. Hickman's Testimony Regarding The Alleged Prior Bad Acts Was Harmless Beyond
A Reasonable Doubt
The State has failed to meet either its burden of production or persuasion demonstrating

beyond a reasonable doubt, that allowing Ms. Hickman to testify regarding Mr. Wenke' s alleged
prior acts did not contribute to the guilty verdict.

1.

The State Is Required To Prove, Beyond A Reasonable Doubt, That Allowing
Ms. Hickman To Testify To Mr. Wenke's Alleged Prior Bad Acts Did Not
Contribute To The Guilty Verdict, Not That A Guilty Verdict Would Have Been
Rendered Had The Jury Not Heard The Testimony

The State claims, "'Where the issue is the admission of improper evidence, such
admission will be considered harmless if there is other competent evidence to the same effect
upon which a jury could reach the same result."' (Resp. Br., p.26 (quoting Pacheco v. Safeco Ins.
Co. of Am., 116 Idaho 794, 798 (1989).) Thus, the State suggests this Court should consider

3

Notably, within minutes of testifying that she lied at the preliminary hearing, Ms. Hickman
testified that she did not lie at the preliminary hearing. (Tr., p.305, L.12 - p.306, L. 10, p.342,
Ls.3-5.) She was also clearly still confused as to where and when things happened on the day in
question. (Tr., p.342, L. 7 - p.344, L.16.)
13

whether the jury would have found Mr. Wenke guilty had they not heard the challenged
testimony. This is simply the wrong standard of review.
"To establish harmless error, the State must prove 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."' State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900,
911 (2015) (citing State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2010) (in tum quoting Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)); see also State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669
(2010) ( applying Chapman to an error in admitting evidence about the defendant's alleged prior
bad acts). Thus, it is not enough for the State to assert the jury would have convicted Mr. Wenke
if the district court did not allow Ms. Hickman to testify as to the alleged prior acts.

The State

must first assert, and then prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that her testimony to that effect did
not contribute to the guilty verdict.

2.

The State Has Failed To Argue, Much Less Demonstrate Beyond A Reasonable
Doubt, That The Testimony Did Not Contribute To The Verdict Obtained

Based upon its claim that there was "undisputed evidence" that Mr. Wenke had the intent
to distribute, the State argues, "Because Hickman's testimony was only introduced to show
intent and the jury could use" other testimony "'to the same effect,'" any error in the admission
of Hickman's testimony was harmless. (Resp. Br., p.26, (quoting Pacheco, 116 Idaho at 798).)
The State's entire harmless error argument is based upon an erroneous standard ofreview. The
State has failed to acknowledge, let alone address, the question of whether the testimony

contributed to the verdict. As such, the State has failed to adequately raise, properly analyze,
and sufficiently prove, that the district court's erroneous decision to allow Ms. Hickman to
testify as to Mr. Wenke's alleged prior acts is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, it
has waived the issue.

14

Further, even if the State's espoused standard was correct, it could not prove the
testimony was harmless.

It argues, "Officer Mattson testified, based on his training and

experience, that 6.61 ounces of marijuana is a significant amount of marijuana, is inconsistent
with personal use, and evidences the individual's intent to traffic marijuana." (Resp. Br., p.26.)
But Ms. Hickman was also charged with felony possession of marijuana based on this amount
being found in her bedroom. (Tr., p.315, L.20-p.316, L.15.) Therefore, particularly in light of
the fact that other marijuana and paraphernalia was found throughout her house, her children
were smoking it, and she was caught a week later with another ounce of marijuana in her car
(R., pp.15-16, 88; Tr., p.253, L.4 - p.255, L.1. ), the jury could easily have believed she had the
intent to distribute the marijuana discovered in her house. The very same reasoning applies to
the State's argument about Ms. Witte testifying that she "overheard Hickman and Wenke talking
about marijuana as a 'way to make money."' (Resp. Br., p.26.) Thus, even if the State had not
cited to the wrong standard, it could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Hickman's
testimony did not contribute to the verdict. Indeed, it was crucial to the State's attempts to show
Mr. Wenke had the intent to distribute the marijuana as opposed to Ms. Hickman having that
intent.
III.
The State Violated Mr. Wenke's Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Prosecutorial Misconduct
Amounting To Fundamental Error
During closing argument, the prosecutor stated, "[W]hat constitutes reasonable doubt, is
so vague and shifting. It's very really subjective when it comes down to it .... " (Tr., p.489,
Ls.10-12.)

This

misrepresentation

diminished

and

distorted

the

State's

burden.

"Misconduct may occur by the prosecutor diminishing or distorting the state's burden to prove
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the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Felder, 150 Idaho 269, 274 (Ct. App.
2010).
In its respondent's brief, the State-in attempting to argue that this misrepresentation did
not violate Mr. Wenke's right to a fair trial-breaks down the prosecutor's language word for
word. (Resp. Br., p.29.) It concedes the prosecutor's use of the word "vague" was "perhaps
inartful," but claims that it was "not necessarily incorrect." (Resp. Br., p.29.) In support of this,
it argues that the United States Supreme Court has previously stated that the reasonable doubt
standard "defies easy explication." (Resp. Br., p.29 (quoting Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5
( 1994). ) It compares this with one definition of the word vague: "not clearly expressed: stated
in indefmite terms." (Resp. Br., p.29.) Describing the reasonable doubt burden as "vague,"
however, diminished and distorted the State's burden for multiple reasons. First, it had the effect
of redefming and obscuring the definition in the instruction.
synonyms for the word.

Second, there are multiple

Two of those are "indistinct" and "uncertain."

BLACK'S LAW

DICTIONARY 1689 (9th ed. 2009). Thus, depending on how the jurors typically understood the
word, they could feel that, because their doubt could be uncertain or merely possible. In other
words, they could interpret what reasonable doubt meant in any way they saw fit. This is the
danger inherent in trying to describe the standard beyond the description in the instruction.
Finally, this interpretation was reinforced by the prosecutor's use of the words "subjective," and
particularly "shifting."
The State claims the prosecutor's use of the word '"subjective' was, in fact, correct."
(Resp. Br., p.29.) While the United States Supreme Court has stated that a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt requires "a subjective state of near certitude," Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 315 (1979) (citation omitted), the prosecutor here was not telling the jury that they had
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to reach such a state, but was describing the standard as subjective. In other words, he was
describing reasonable doubt as "peculiar to a particular individual," https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/subjective (last accessed June 17, 2019), or "[b]ased on an individual's
perceptions, feelings or intentions, as opposed to externally verifiable phenomena . . . . "
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1561 (9th ed. 2009). These definitions suggest jurors can ignore
evidence or lack of evidence, which conflicts with the standard instruction: reasonable doubt
"may arise from a careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence or from lack of
evidence." (Tr., p.157, Ls.20-22.)
The State also argues that "[i]n context, the prosecutor's description of 'what constitutes
reasonable doubt' as 'shifting' implies simply that what constitutes reasonable doubt can 'shift[]'
or change from one person to another .... " (Resp. Br., p.29.) This blithe interpretation of the
"context" of the prosecutor's statement makes no sense. There is no context here because, after
his statement misrepresenting the State's burden, the prosecutor immediately went back to
discussing his illustration ofreasonable doubt as a "puzzle ... missing two letters." (Tr., p.489,
Ls.9-23.) Finally, considering each individual word in isolation does not take into account the
overall impact of those words when used together.

When used together, the words give a

completely different meaning to reasonable doubt. Indeed, they suggest reasonable doubt does
not need to be based on reason and common sense. As such, the State has failed to show that
Mr. Wenke's due process right to a fair trial was not violated by the prosecutor's misconduct.
With respect to the other two prongs of the fundamental error test, the State relies on this
Court's recent opinion in State v. Miller, No. 46517, 2019 WL 1217673 (Idaho Mar. 15, 2019),
which was issued after the appellant's brief was filed in this case. (Resp. Br., pp.30-31.) Miller
changed the fundamental error analysis with respect to the second and third prongs of the test.
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Regarding the second prong—the requirement that the error be clear from the record—the Court
wrote, “This means the record must contain evidence of the error and the record must also
contain evidence as to whether or not trial counsel made a tactical decision in failing to object.”
Id. at *2. It went on to state, “[W]e clarify that whether trial counsel made a tactical decision in
failing to object is a claim that must be supported by evidence in the record.” Id.
In this case, the error is certainly clear from the prosecutor’s statements. (Tr., p.489,
Ls.10-12.) Further, because the record reveals no objectively reasonable basis not to object to
such a blatant distortion and diminution of the State’s burden, the record shows that trial
counsel’s failure to object was not tactical. The State speculates that, “Wenke’s counsel could
have made the tactical decision to let the prosecutor proverbially shoot himself in the foot by
describing an increased standard of proof rather than object and correct the mistake.” (Resp.
Br., pp.30-31 (emphasis in original).) This is absurd. It is clear from the prosecutor’s statements
that he most certainly was not describing an increased standard of proof but one that was
uncertain and subject to change based on an individual’s feelings about it.
Miller also clarified the third prong of the fundamental error test as follows: “the third
prong of Perry requires that the defendant demonstrate that the clear error in the record—i.e., the
error identified in the first and second prongs—actually affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.” Id. In other words, the error must be shown not to be harmless. The United
States Supreme Court has held that an improper reasonable doubt instruction cannot be harmless.
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280-81 (1993). The Court stated, “[T]he Fifth Amendment
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury
verdict are interrelated. It would not satisfy the Sixth Amendment to have a jury determine that
the defendant is probably guilty . . . .” Id. at 278.
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Here, the same reasoning applies. Anytime the prosecutor argues for a reduced burden of
proof, the error cannot be harmless.

In other words, the prosecutor's misconduct in

misrepresenting the reasonable doubt burden affected the outcome of the trial because it allowed
the jurors to render a verdict based on a different standard. Indeed, where the prosecutor clearly
advocates for the jury to apply such a standard, the finding of guilt shows that the error actually
affected the outcome of the trial. Further, given the raft of evidence on which the jury could
have relied to infer that Ms. Hickman had the intent to distribute the marijuana found in her
home (see App. Br., pp.21-22), the guilty verdict showed that the State's misrepresentation of the
reasonable doubt burden affected the outcome of the trial.
The State does not address this evidence.

Instead, in arguing that the prosecutor's

statements were harmless, it claims the prosecutor "insisted that the jury follow-not deviate
from-the jury's instruction." (Resp. Br., p.31.) This is not true. The prosecutor talked about
the instruction and then misrepresented what reasonable doubt actually meant. (Tr., p.488, L.16
- p.489, L.13.) This amounted to fundamental error, and the State has failed to show that the
prosecutor's statements were harmless. 4

4

Because the State's arguments regarding Mr. Wenke's two other claims of fundamental error
are unremarkable, he does not offer additional argument on those claims. However, he asserts
that those claims also satisfy the three prongs of the fundamental error test as clarified in Miller
because his due process right to a fair trial was violated when the prosecutor misstated the
evidence, improperly vouched for the credibility of the accomplice witnesses, and appealed to
the passions and prejudice of the jury. (App. Br., pp.22-27.) He also submits that these errors
were clear from the record and affected the outcome of the trial.
19

CONCLUSION
Mr. Wenke respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
remand this case to the district court for a new trial.
DATED this 20th day of June, 2019.

/ s/ Reed P. Anderson
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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